A. Improvement in selection and training procedure
A model training policy was prepared by the National Police Bureau with the technical assistance of GIZ (The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (English: German Agency for International Cooperation GmbH), under the Gender Responsive
Policing Project. The policy, drawing its objectives from Police Rules 1934 and Police Order 2002, emphasized that police training has an important role in developing the necessary attitudes, skills and knowledge and enabling police officers of all ranks to undertake their roles and responsibilities as expected under police rules and international standards of law enforcement. The policy noted that a less specialized training was being imparted to all police cadres in police training institutes which, consequently, were mostly breeding non-professionals. Therefore, it recommended replacing obsolete methods with modern standardized courses for each rank. The policy also called for a shift of excessive focus from parade to course-specific training involving multiple subjects, including counter-terrorism drills. The policy was subsequently adopted by different national, provincial and regional police organizations
.
1. Strengthened Policy Implementation Mechanisms
Implementing policy recommendations, some provinces have established training management boards and Curriculum Development Committees (CDC) to improve the quality of police training on sustainable basis.
Punjab and Balochistan police have established Training Development Units (TDUs)under the supervision of DIG/Training comprising of Chief Law Instructors from all PTIs. The main task of TDUs is to review the existing curricula and give recommendations for new course contents for further approval of the TMB. In Punjab, a CDC, with the same composition as of TDU, has been constituted to review the existing courses, recommend the addition of fresh contents, suggest modifications and ensure standard of training for each rank. The CDC further ensures that courses are designed according to the training policy objectives. Another function of the CDC is to ensure that a list of approved courses with detailed contents is made available to all training institutions before the beginning of any course to ensure uniformity.
2. Development of Modern Curricula
Many police training institutes have revised the basic course for recruits and new subjects such as counter-terrorism tactics, human trafficking, gender discrimination, human rights, character building, and anti-riot strategy have been added, removing unnecessary contents form the course. Besides physical exercises like drill, parade, assault course, firing and Judo Karate, which were already part of the courses, a new Field Craft Course had also been included in the training which aims to prepare the police for overcoming hurdles during raids. Given the challenge of combating terrorism, an additional three months course on anti-terrorism has been added for all basic recruits in the rank of Constable, ASI and ASP.
In 2011, Sindh Police launched a Curriculum Development Program in partnership with INL to revamp Sindh's outdated training curriculum. The Program focused on developing the local training curriculum by Pakistani police for Pakistani police, developing master trainers and incorporating the new modules at all Sindh Police training institutions. Under the program, international standard modules in English, Urdu and Sindhi have been developed on the following:
1. Basic Investigation
2. Protecting Human Rights
3. Forensic Investigation
4. Community Policing
5. Advanced Investigation
6. Criminal Law
7. Police Station Working
8. Counter Terrorism
9. General Police Duty
3. Up gradation of Police Training Facilities and Infrastructure
To cater to growing training needs of police organizations, many police training facilities have been upgraded to next levels. In Punjab, Police Training Schools, Chung and Multan have been upgraded as Colleges while Police Recruits Training Centres, Farooqabad (Sheikhupura), and Rawat (Rawalpindi) have been upgraded as Schools.
In Punjab and Sindh,
in the wake of an increased influx of trainees, infrastructure development of police training institutes has been a major priority. It involved expansion of classrooms, hostels, sports facilities, firing ranges, services and amenities, such as provision of clean drinking water and laundry. Mock crime scenes and mini forensic labs have also been constructed to improve investigation training. Police trainers from PTIs have been trained as gender trainers to sensitize male and female police trainees to provide gender-sensitive services to women seeking police assistance. Police officers are sensitized on new laws supporting the safeguarding of women from violence. In Balochistan, expansion work in Police Training College, Quetta is underway with the assistance of UNODC. Additionally, PRTC, Kachmore is being reconstructed.
NHMP training facility at Sheikhupura was converted to a full-fledged training college.
4. Establishment of Specialized Schools
To promote functional specialization, police organizations are increasingly focusing on establishing training facilities for specialized functions. KP police takes the lead by establishing 06 new specialized training institutes from 2014-15: School of Investigation, Peshawar, School of Intelligence, Abbottabad, School of Tactics, Peshawar, School of Public Disorder & Riot Management, Mardan, School of Explosive Handling, Nowshera and School of Information Technology, Peshawar. Punjab and Sindh Police also established Schools of Investigation in the following PTCs with the assistance of GIZ under its Criminal Investigation Support program: Sihala, Chung and Saeedabad. The Schools of Investigations have been established to educate and train police investigators in criminal investigations. The Schools have three departments:
Digital Investigation, Death Investigation and Violence against Women and Children. In Sindh, the Specialized Commando Training Centre (SCTC) and Traffic Training Institute (TTI) Saeedabad were established in 2008.
5. Introduction of Specialized Courses
With the assistance of ICITAP
,
the National Police Academy developed a special course based on a job task analysis for DPOs. In Sindh, specialized courses were designed, with the assistance of GIZ, to build the professional capacity of trainers/instructors, first responders, investigation officers, duty officers, moharrirs, SHOs, traffic enforcement official, education and engineering personnel and forensics experts. GIZ has also supported Sindh police in developing its capacity, professional competency and infrastructure in conducting specialized courses at police training centres across Sindh through a comprehensive training programme. Punjab Police has also introduced specialized courses on homicide investigation, terrorism investigation, traffic management, crime scene management, intelligence analysis, gender-based violence (GBV), human rights, and community policing.
6. Induction of Better Qualified Trainers with Enhanced Incentives
The quality of trainers has been very poor in the past. Most of them were not trained in delivering training and used to indulge in abusive and derogatory behaviour with the trainees. This aspect is being gradually reduced through a series of TOTs programs addressed by police organizations across Pakistan. With the assistance of different international agencies, a series of TOTs programs have been conducted. With UNODC’s assistance, the Punjab Police organized several TOTs Courses at Police Training College, Sihala to improve the capacity of its trainers. The Sindh police, under a capacity development project with the assistance of GIZ, trained 200 master trainers who subsequently trained over 5,000 other police officers in 2014.In collaboration with DFID, UNODC and European Union, the KP Police conducted TOTs under the Aitebaar Program and Pakistan's Action to Counter Terrorism project.11 A policy providing certain incentives like special allowance, one-step promotion and preferential nominations for training courses were given to police officers if they opted for a tenure of three years posting in a training institute as a trainer.
7. Adoption of Modern Training Aids
PTIs are slowly adopting modern technologies for making training more effective. With the assistance from INL, PTS, Islamabad and PTC, Saeedabad installed firearms simulators in 2018 to improve the capacity of the institution and increase its ability to deliver safe and proper firearms training for police personnel. Police College, Sihala is also using firearms simulators for this purpose. A mock crime scene training facility was established in Police College, Sihala in 2016 with the support of GIZ. The facility features models of murder, bank robbery, suicide and other heinous crimes through which police officers under training will be trained about the collection and preservation of evidence, analysing them and presenting them before the court. A total of 30 state of the art firing simulators have been installed at 07 training institutions.
8. Training in the Adaptations of Protective Measures
The Sindh Police has started a new training program for its personnel in the wake of incidents of ‘accidental’ killings of two minor girls: 10-year-old Amal, who was killed in an encounter in Karachi and seven-year-old Aqsa, who was killed by a stray bullet which was later discovered to have been fired by a police official while cleaning his gun. The training aims to equip personnel with the skills to deal with precarious situations during police encounters, particularly in congested areas where the risk of collateral damage is far higher.
9. Conduct of Examination
The conduct of examination is a very important aspect in any PTI. Except some random instructions from time to time, there was no uniform examination policy being followed regarding examinations and permission to re-appear for failures in basic as well as promotional courses. To standardize the conduct of examinations, a policy was issued in Punjab in 2012.
10. E-learning Programs
To complement the traditional training system of Police and to enhance the knowledge of personnel in specialized areas along international standards, police organizations have established over 50 Computer-based Training Centres with the support of UNODC. These centres have imparted training on crime prevention and investigation. In Punjab alone, over 15,000 police personal have undergone various training, completing a total of 60,000 hours in duration of training. UNODC is currently transforming the training platform from computer-based to a full-scale E-learnings the most advanced tool of training and certification for the law enforcement. It will be available in online format with additional features and benefits.
Introduction of Gender-Responsive Curriculum Modules on gender-responsive policing is mandatory in police trainings and has improved general understanding of gender issues. In addition, the gender trainers modelled new interactive training methodologies to improve the overall training environment. Police trainers from PTIs have been trained as gender trainers to sensitize male and female police trainees to provide gendersensitive services to women seeking police assistance and police officers on pro-women laws.
B. Organizational restructuring
Before reform measures can be considered, a clear understanding of the present status of the law enforcement structure is essential. There are two sets of law enforcement organizations in Pakistan: those that operate under the federal government, and the provincial police organizations.
Nineteen major organizations operate directly under the federal government dealing with a variety of law enforcement responsibilities (including intelligence gathering, border and coast surveillance, and policing) and answering to different authorities. The total strength of all law enforcement and intelligence services’ officials at the disposal of the federal government (with cross-provincial jurisdiction) is approximately 210,000. Rarely do these organizations coordinate their plans and activities or strategize together. The chain of command of the organizations varies, which further complicates coordination and collective policy planning. As a result, decisions are often poorly implemented.
The eighteen federal law enforcement organizations can be grouped into four broad categories:
1.
. These forces include five paramilitary organizations, namely, the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh and Punjab), the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency, the Frontier Corps (KPP and Balochistan), and the Frontier Constabulary and Northern Areas Scouts (Gilgit-Baltistan), in addition to the Islamabad Police and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).
2. Police planning and management organizations
under the Ministry of the Interior. These include the National Police Bureau, the National Police Management Board, the National Police Foundation, and the National Public Safety Commission. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is the latest organization to be included in this category.
3. Other federal organizations
. In this category are those organizations that are not under the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior. They include the National Highways and Motorway Police (under the Ministry of Communications), the Pakistan Railways Police (under the Ministry of Railways), the Airport Security Force (under the Ministry of Defense), and the AntiNarcotics Force (under the Ministry of Narcotics Control).
4. Intelligence organizations. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), a civilian agency, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), led by a serving army lieutenant general, are the two major intelligence outfits. They have regional and provincial offices throughout Pakistan.
The second category of law enforcement infrastructure comprises the four provincial police organizations, as well as those operational in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). These provincial and regional police organizations are all organized along similar lines and abide by the same set of laws and rules. For instance, the procedural criminal laws (i.e., the Pakistan Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order) are uniformly applicable to all parts of the country (except FATA).
The Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), a federal service recruited through the Federal Public Service Commission, provides more than 80 percent of senior supervisory officers (with the rank of assistant superintendent of police and above, who act as subdivisional police chiefs) to the provincial police departments. Its recruitment, training, and career management (including transfers to provinces and federal law enforcement agencies) are managed by the Establishment Division (federal government), though PSP officers report to provincial governments and draw their salaries from provincial budgetary provisions. These PSP officers can be assigned to any province, but lower ranks of police are permanent employees of provincial police organizations and cannot be transferred outside their respective provinces. Since the British era, this complicated service structure has created an elitist PSP that is a source of frustration for junior ranks.
Reasons for the Weakness of the Law Enforcement Infrastructure
There is a broad consensus in Pakistan that after decades of abuse and neglect, its police force is failing to combat crime effectively, uphold the law, provide basic security to citizens, and fight growing militancy. Since its inception in 1947, despite frequent ethnic confrontations, sectarian battles, and sharp rises in criminal or insurgent activity, policy makers have never put the law enforcement and police sector at the top of their priority list for investment and reform. As a result, the overall police infrastructure is poorly organized. Many reports were commissioned to improve policing standards, but either their recommendations were too general or the governments of the day lacked the will to implement the recommended changes. Some of the major reasons relevant to police engagement in counterterrorism activities are insufficient numbers and scant resources, institutional disconnect, political challenges, corruption, and lack of modernization.
1) Insufficient Numbers and Scant Resources
Pakistan’s total population is estimated to be around 180 million, and the combined federal and provincial law enforcement forces (including paramilitary and related wings of the intelligence organizations) have a total strength of close to 575,000 personnel.12 Thus, the police–population ratio is one police official for every 304 persons.(2009).
In the domain of counterterrorism, despite the sharp rise in terrorist attacks across the country, no significant investment has been made in specialized expertise. For instance, the FIA’s Special Investigation Group, which is responsible for investigating major terrorist attacks in the country, has a very limited number of terrorism specialists.
2) Provincial Police Forces, Islamabad Police, and Others
While substantial financial commitments
have been made to increase the police capacity in KPP, the KPP administration has serious concerns about the availability of funds. According to the KPP government, and the financial budget for police has more than doubled over the past five years. However, unexpectedly large increases in salaries, health care costs, and compensation for police officials killed in the line of duty have depleted the funds needed for expansion.
Fortunately, the belated but critical U.S. support for the provincial police force has helped the institution through increased resources and enhanced professional expertise to tackle terrorism. The support included specialized training for officers, the upgrading of police stations in sensitive areas, funds for the establishment of the first police academy for women, and the provision of protective gear, modern communications systems, and vehicles to KPP police. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs deserves credit for some of these initiatives.
Punjab Province has also made a significant contribution to increasing police capacity in the 2009–10 budget.19 A sharp rise in terrorist attacks in Punjab, especially in Lahore, targeting religious institutions and police infrastructure convinced the provincial government of the need to increase resources for police.
In Sindh Province, while a lobby within the Sindh police in support of change has been gaining strength, no reforms of sub stance have been implemented. An analysis conducted by some pro-reform police officers concluded that nothing short of a “cultural transformation” in the police institutions would bear any fruit. The analysis revealed the following: junior officers, who manage police stations, are unqualified for the job; ordinary police officials work between sixteen and eighteen hours a day; and an insufficient number of police in urban centers has compromised law enforcement efficiency. Unprecedented levels of street crime and a consistent pattern of ethnic and sectarian-motivated target killings in Karachi are just one indication of the nature of the challenge.
The situation in Balochistan is even more desperate. In January 2010 in Quetta city, hundreds of police officials surrounded the governor’s and chief minister’s residences to protest low salaries. The protesting officers used official weapons for aerial firing, blocked various roads, damaged vehicles, and beat up civilians. Though stern action was taken against senior officials, the only improvement made after the crisis ended was an increase in the compensation for police personnel killed by terrorists while on duty. Islamabad police also suffer from inadequate force numbers. It is especially surprising in light of the nature of the threat to the capital city.
The resource capacity of law enforcement organizations, other than the provincial police forces, is inconsistent. The National Highways and Motorway Police, established in 1997, is one of the most efficient organizations in the country and an almost corruptionfree institution as a result of higher salaries, good training facilities, recruitment on merit, and the availability of modern equipment. However, other federal law enforcement organizations, such as the Pakistan Railways Police and the Airport Security Force, have not been that fortunate. In recent months the Pakistan Railways Police could not install donated scanners at two important and vulnerable stations because of a lack of funds, and its request for closed circuit cameras in twenty-three large railway stations has not been fulfilled. Similarly, the Airport Security Force continues to use a type of bomb detector at one of the largest airports whose export from the UK was banned after it led to the deaths of 275 people.
3) Political Challenges
The police in Pakistan have traditionally been used by the state to suppress dissent and tame opposition. Many senior police officers became politicized in recent decades in an attempt to be in the good books of one political party or the other, and prized field appointments are often made based on political connections. Ironically, the Police Act of 1861 (along with the Police Rules of 1934), a colonial legacy that was meant to control people rather than serve them, remained applicable in Pakistan as a central law (with very minor modifications) until 2002, when a reform-oriented Police Order replaced it. The autocratic and oppressive nature of the old law negatively affected police culture and the professionalism of the force.
In rural areas (almost 60 percent of the country), local police officers can influence the fate of politicians in elections by allowing or curbing rigging. Moreover, feudal and tribal elements in remote areas often use police for torturing or “teaching a lesson” to their opponents, who are mostly peasants. Hence, they need influence with the police. Therefore, while Musharraf’s new law was very good on the books, few of the changes were ever implemented, and various amendments inspired by political expediencies were incorporated into the law in 2004, thus nullifying the intent and purpose of the original 2002 act. This is a clear indication of the level of politicization in decision making pertaining to the police force; even well-thought-out plans are virtually impossible to implement without strong political will.
4) Lack of Modernization and Corruption
There is a general perception that the institution of the police is corrupt, institutionally incompetent, and brutal. Consequently, justice is elusive, insecurity is rampant, and ordinary citizens are the victims of this system. Even internal police assessments acknowledge the police force’s lack of credibility in the public eye.
However, in the overall scenario and in comparative terms, police performance is not much different from the functioning of customs officials, bureaucrats running the provincial and federal secretariats, and the intelligence services. The police officers get the most blame because they are visible to everyone and are expected to do everything in Pakistan, from crisis management to resolving political and legal disputes, in addition to facing the wrath of people venting their frustrations over blunders committed by the country’s leadership, both political and military.
5) Counterterrorism Capacity and Inter-Institutional Complexities
The Pakistani police force was traditionally not trained for counterterrorism. Indeed, for reasons of lack of training and insufficient capacity. Lack of police expertise in countering the growing extremist menace is undermining the stability of the Pakistani state and claiming thousands of lives in terrorist attacks. In the counterterrorism segment of the larger law enforcement sphere, a number of overarching problems are obvious impediments to reform efforts.
6) Dysfunctional Relationship between Police and Intelligence Organizations
Lack of trust and coordination between the police force and intelligence outfits have been a long-standing concern for Pakistani law enforcers, and this concern is amplified by the sometimes close relationship between certain armed groups and elements of the intelligence services.
In private discussions police officers routinely mention apprehending militants and criminals but quickly receiving “requests” from intelligence agencies (civilian or military) to let them go. Poor data collection with regard to crimes and criminals is another major lacuna in the system. Many criminals who join militant religious groups are not traced and tracked efficiently. Even banned militant organizations are not well profiled. According to a senior official of NACTA, many militants currently incarcerated have not been interviewed by experts, which is critical to understanding their networks.
A discernible lack of coordination among the police force, the civilian-run IB, and the military-run intelligence agencies lies at the heart of the problem. For instance, to get data from telephone companies (to trace calls made by criminals and terrorists), the police and the FIA must send a request to intelligence agencies, and the time delay can be crucial to the investigation.
Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, a renowned Pakistani politician who remained interior minister during the Musharraf years, publicly acknowledged that coordi nation between and among the ISI, IB, police, and the Special Branch of the police is far from satisfactory and that intelligence agencies often have information but do not share it with law enforcement agencies.
Recommendations for Traditional Reforms
The following recommendations can help the traditional reform aspects.
1. Implement the original 2002 Police Act nationwide.
All of the 2004 amendments to the 2002 Police Act, which reintroduced tools of political manipulation, should be discarded and the new ideas introduced in the Punjab Police Act of 2010, which makes police more accountable and encourages a community policing model, should be incorporated into the original 2002 Police Act. All four provinces, FATA, the Azad Kashmir region, and Gilgit Baltistan should be governed by a common police act.
2. Increase public awareness.
The level of public awareness about the changes introduced with the 2002 reforms was very low. As a result, the new mechanisms for ensuring police independence and opportunities for redress of grievances against police high-handedness remained largely unimplemented. A public information campaign focusing on citizens’ rights and police accountability can help this cause. Lately, the independent broadcast media in Pakistan have started exposing police brutality and are making an impact nationwide. The government of Pakistan needs to understand that an effective and independent police service will add to the legitimacy of democratic governance.
3. Focus on junior officers.
Investigative field work is primarily done by junior ranks, whereas most of the international training facilities are currently offered to senior supervisory officers. This pattern needs to be reversed so that junior officers have significant training opportunities.
4. Provide training support and equipment.
Pakistan has a poor track record in utilizing international aid, especially when it comes in the form of financial handouts. Corrupt officials in Pakistan and foreign private contractors from donor countries often benefit most from such aid. Support for investigative training and help in the acquisition of modern equipment (e.g., small weapons, scanners, bulletproof jackets, armored vehicles) will be more effective. Moreover, police training academies are often overlooked by international donors, an over sight that needs correction.58 Finally, foreign donors should avoid framing everything in the context of counterterrorism, as Pakistani public opinion is likely to be more appreciative of international help in this arena if it is focused on enhancing the crime-fighting capacity of police. Donors should also involve their own police organizations in the process rather than depending overwhelmingly on the private sector.
5. Help NACTA in analytical and research work.
This fledging organization needs both internal and external help in attracting experienced experts and analysts who can focus on scientific and statistical studies dealing with crime patterns and develop databases useful for counterterrorism. For effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, the law enforcement model also needs non-policing corrective measures, such as developing public awareness about the nature of the threat through the media and incorporating counter extremist discourse into the public schools curriculum. Decommissioning the brigades of militants and terrorists will require well-resourced and well-devised deradicalization programs. NACTA can spearhead such initiatives if given requisite funds and independence from bureaucratic channels. Unfortunately, NACTA has already been the victim of political turf battles; its first director general and a leading counterterrorism expert, Tariq Pervez, resigned in July 2010 because of the opposition in some quarters to placing NACTA directly under the prime minister (as opposed to the Ministry of the Interior).
6. Restructuring of law enforcement organizations.
Though Pakistan must resist the temptation to create new specialized antiterrorism structures that marginalize the country’s already existing institutions, establishment of a central organization similar to the Department of Homeland Security in the United States will go a long way toward improving coordination between various law enforcement agencies in the country. The chain of command for various organizations is complicated and dispersed. A restructuring of the overall command setup that brings all the federal institutions under one umbrella can help system effectiveness considerably. Provincial police chiefs, operating under the executive control of chief ministers, can be increasingly involved in policy planning at the central level through this new organization.
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